We examine the impact of ambiguous and contested land rights on investment and productivity in agriculture in Akwapim, Ghana. We show that individuals who hold powerful positions in a local political hierarchy have more secure tenure rights, and that as a consequence they invest more in land fertility and have substantially higher output. The intensity of investments on different plots cultivated by a given individual correspond to that individual's security of tenure over those specific plots and, in turn, to the individual's position in the political hierarchy relevant to those specific plots. ...

We find that insecure land tenure in Ghana is associated with greatly reduced investment in land fertility. Individuals who are not central to the networks of social and political power that permeate these villages are much more likely to have their land expropriated while it is fallow. Their reduced confidence of maintaining their rights over land while it is fallow induces such individuals to fallow their land less than would be technically optimal. As a consequence, farm productivity for these individuals is correspondingly reduced. ...

[T]he degree of insecurity in property rights that we document is huge. Individuals have on the order of a one in three chance of losing control over a plot in any year in which it is not cultivated. Expropriation risk is therefore a very salient aspect of the economic environment.